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ABSTRACT 
Slow agrarian development has often been blamed on the absence of civil society mobili-
zation. This paper quantitatively analyzes the effect of political and fiscal decentralization on ag-
ricultural development in 30 democratizing African States. Hence two hypotheses are tested: H1) 
New democracies that combine elected sub-national governments with fiscal decentralization 
will be more likely to spend more in agriculture. H2) In such system we should observe better 
agricultural outputs, other things equal. Results reveal that counter-intuitively simultaneous 
democratic and fiscal decentralization have a negative impact on public investment in agricul-
ture. On the other hand, as expected fiscal decentralization does not have any significant impact 
in the absence of democratic decentralization. Most importantly democratic decentralization is 
found to have a highly positive impact on the provision of agricultural related public goods when 
  
fiscal decentralization is low. The test also reveals that fiscal and political decentralization posi-
tively influence agricultural production. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Agriculture often has not been placed at the fore front of the development agenda across 
the developing world and especially in Africa. This is a contradiction considering that a majority 
of the work force in many developing countries is concentrated in rural areas. For many through-
out the developing world subsistence farming is the primary means of fulfilling basic needs. The 
scope of the world poorest has been estimated at  more than 1.2 billion, of which three quarter 
are rural dwellers (Taeb and Zakri 2008) and these proportions are estimated to be even higher in 
some regions of Sub-Saharan Africa which has been characterized as “ a sleeping agricultural 
giant” (Carter 2008, 46). “Food security is the most familiar type of security associated with 
poverty and directly related to agriculture (Taeb & Zakri, 2008, p. 3), therefore it has been ar-
gued that agriculture should be considered a crucial way of addressing under-development espe-
cially in Sub-Saharan Africa which suffers from extensive rural poverty. According to some 
World Bank projections a 1% increase in crop yield would decrease poverty by .72% in Africa, 
which is the highest impact across regions (2005, p. 5). Low food production and acute poverty 
have also been correlated with onset of violence, therefore “political stability in Africa may be 
threatened by the failure of agriculture” (Bienen 1987). The stability of many African states rests 
primarily on their ability to relieve poverty, and this goal could be achieved by empowering the 
vast majority of rural dwellers through initiatives aimed at modernizing and increasing food pro-
duction. “Raising farm productivity in subsistence agriculture is one of the highest priorities for 
empowering subsistence farmers. Farmers income depends on factors such as land, water, and 
farm inputs; technology; and access to local or international markets” (Taeb & Zakri, 2008, p. 7) 
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which should be provided by the states under the form of public goods and greater allocation of 
public funds and subsidies.  
However, governments throughout the developing world have consecrated very few re-
sources to developing the sector of activity hiring the majority of their countries’ workforce. In-
deed, between 1990 and 1998 the share of total public expenditure geared toward agriculture de-
clined across regions. In Africa although agriculture represented 18.8% of the GDP in 1998, only 
5% of total public expenditure was directed toward the sector (The World Bank, 2005, p. 94). 
The decline of public expenditure in agriculture among African countries is a major problem, 
because despite empirical evidence of the economic and social benefits of increasing public 
spending in the sector, little progress has been observed in reversing the trend. Therefore, in 
many countries the lack of government’s input in the primary sector of activity has jeopardized 
the prospect for poverty reduction and that despite the third wave of democratization. Indeed, the 
needs of vast impoverished agrarian populations remain poorly addressed in many parts of the 
developing world. It seems important and legitimate to try understanding why in some consoli-
dating democracies with vast agrarian majorities, most particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, there 
is limited governments’ involvement in promoting agricultural development.  
This paper is an attempt to draw a relationship between democratic institutions and agri-
cultural development through the analysis of the effect of political and fiscal decentralization on 
agricultural input and output in 30 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over a period of ten years be-
tween 2000 and 2010. Democratic decentralization is believed to favor the empowerment of rural 
constituents and strengthen mechanisms of accountability at the local level. When local leaders 
are elected, and accountable to their constituents they are more likely to be responsive and pro-
vide public goods to assure electoral support from the community they are representing.  Within 
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a democratic framework the provision of public goods to rural citizens will more likely aim at 
fulfilling their primary needs which should translate into greater public investments in the sector 
of activity that employs a vast majority of the rural population. Increased government’s input in 
agriculture should also translate into greater output in the sector. To test the argument a cross-
sectional time series regression model is preferred to better capture the variations of both the de-
pendent and independent variable as decentralization is an ongoing process in most of Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
2 EXPLORING THE LITERATURE  
The literature extensively discusses the lack of agrarian reform throughout the developing 
world. Therefore many approaches and arguments have been brought to bear on the question. 
This section provides an overview of the arguments developed in the literature to explain slow 
agricultural growth in the developing world. 
Collective Action Dilemmas. In industrialized countries, strong civil societies are often 
organized around agricultural policies and policy reform thus favoring government responsive-
ness to rural constituents; whereas in developing states where the rural population is predominant 
the literature displays little evidence of social mobilization around rural interests. According to 
Gyimah-Boadi (1996), the weakness of civil society in developing areas has been linked to col-
lective action dilemmas. The normative argument revolves around the fact that in many areas of 
the developing world, there seems to be a pattern of fragmented civil societies which are devel-
oping along ethno-regional and religious divides. This has been the case in many African states, 
where high ethno-linguistic fractionalization has been exploited by politicians to mobilize sup-
port in a ‘divide to better control’ type of scheme. When social movements are organized along 
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identity lines and on the ground of competing with other identity based groups it seems difficult 
to successfully mobilize homogeneous movements pushing for major common economic inter-
ests. Putnam’s analysis (1993) suggests that successful civic engagement has more often oc-
curred through networks encompassing large segments of society thus encouraging collaboration 
at the community level; whereas networks based on strong social bonds such as blood, kinship 
and identity ties tend to result in the development of small particular groups which have less 
weight in influencing political outcomes or institutional efficiency. According to this analysis, 
the networks of civic engagement have to cut across social cleavages to yield the widespread so-
cietal cooperation necessary to pressure governments into investing in the agrarian sector. There-
fore, throughout the developing world “the contribution of civil society to democratic consolida-
tion has been more disappointing in the key areas of economic reform and development” (Gyi-
mah-Boadi, 1996). 
The Modernization Approach. A well advanced industrialization has often been posed as 
a vector of empowerment for the agrarian sector. According to Varshney (1995), “the historical 
trajectory of rural power […] has been paradoxical in nature. In the early phases of development, 
when rural dwellers constitute a majority of a country’s population, they have historically been 
the weakest” (Varshney, 1995  p2). On the other hand, it is generally recognized that the power 
of farm groups in developed states has often led to high protectionist measures for the agricultur-
al sector under the form of subsidies which represent greater government input in a sector of ac-
tivity constituting a very small share of developed countries’ GDP. This is observable in the 
United States or the European Union where the agrarian sector is a highly protected one as gov-
ernment provides farmers with unfair advantages relatively to the international market. Some 
have argued that in developed states, industrialization and the transfer of workforce from the 
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primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors of activity have enabled rural organization to be-
come easier and more efficient because interest groups have become smaller thus minimizing 
collective action dilemmas. Therefore, some scholars and critics attribute the weakness of rural 
civil society in developing areas and the slow agrarian development to low levels of industriali-
zation (Orvis, 2003). 
Democracy and Rural Empowerment. However, while looking at India, we observe that 
despite the vast concentration of labor in the farming sector, the relatively low level of industrial-
ization, and the high heterogeneity of the social structure, rural populations have acquired sub-
stantial power in the political process and enjoy better access to public goods. Varshney argues 
that in the case of India, “democracy preceding an industrial revolution, has led to the empow-
erment of the rural sector within the polity” (1995, p. 3). This argument suggests a relationship 
between democracy, empowerment of rural constituency and agricultural development. Accord-
ing to Varshney (1995), the early democratization of the Indian society enabled the vast majority 
of the constituency to translate their interests into policies that lead to significant reforms.  In In-
dia, the strengthening of rural mobilization can be observed for example through the fact that a 
relatively high number of Indian Congressmen have rural backgrounds and are dedicated to 
pushing forward the interests of the vast agrarian society. This argument emphasizes the im-
portance of political institutions and embedded political leadership in translating the interests of 
constituents into efficient economic policies. This analysis suggests that democratized agrarian 
societies tend to be more responsive to farmers’ demands even in the absence of industrializa-
tion. However, the empowerment of the rural sector at an early stage of development in India has 
been described as exceptional. We observe that in many consolidating polities, where industriali-
zation has not yet happened, this trend has yet to be observed. The puzzle remains why in transi-
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tioning democracies the immediate economic interests of the majority of the constituency has 
often not translated into the implementation of more efficient agrarian policies and increased 
government’s input in that sector.  
A Structural Approach. According to Heller (2009), the farmers’ movement in India po-
litically mobilized 'well off' farmers who are a minority compared to the largest constituency of 
landless laborers. Heller (2009) suggests that in India any movements of the agrarian poor took 
place outside the political arena, under the form of insurrections. Heller’s analysis characterizes 
the policy based agrarian reform described by Varshney (1995) as the result of the mobilization 
of interests among agents of the ‘political society’ rather than ‘civil society’. The extensive liter-
ature on consolidation often exclusively focuses on ‘de jure’ aspects of democratization and the 
institutionalization of democratic processes and norms. However, the subsequent institutionaliza-
tion of democratic rules has not always automatically translated into the effective exercise of 
‘citizenship’. The literature on democratic deepening distinguishes between the political society 
and the civil society while discussing consolidating democracies. The political society has been 
defined as “the set of actors that compete for, and the institutions that regulate (in a democratic 
system) the right to exercise legitimate political authority (p. 124); whereas the civil society “re-
fers to non-state and non-market forms of voluntary association that are governed by communi-
cative practices” (p. 124). Putnam (1993) makes a similar distinction between different types of 
citizenship. Putnam introduces the notion of ‘civicness’ and civic engagement as the “active par-
ticipation in public affairs” (87) and posits ‘civic virtue’ as the determinant factor explaining 
whether democratic institutions succeed or fail. Heller (2009) points that although the literature 
assumes that civil society and political society have mutually reinforcing relationships, in consol-
idating states they are often in tension with each other thus hindering the process of democratic 
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deepening. This analysis suggests that the dichotomization of the citizenry leads to the political 
domination of one group by the other, and favors the concentration of political power in the 
hands of a limited group of citizens within the democratic framework. According to this analysis, 
the political society in transitioning democracies has been overshadowing civil society. Based on 
the case studies of India and South Africa, Heller (2009) argues that the dichotomization of the 
citizenry in consolidating polities is the result of structural-historic unbalance of power that has 
been established from the first days of independence. Heller develops a path-dependency argu-
ment in explaining the weakness of the civil society which is attributed to the need of the emerg-
ing political class to maintain control over the masses in order to achieve stable political transi-
tion and the institutionalization of democratic processes without much opposition. However, the 
necessity of maintaining the masses weak has also lead to the emergence of dominant elite clas-
ses’ coalitions which have secured both political and economic positions along the process thus 
keeping rural masses from actively participating and gaining public goods from their representa-
tives.  Although the path dependency argument is compelling, there is also a structural question 
with regards to institutions and their role in including and serving the interests of the vast majori-
ty within a democratic context. 
In many developing nations, where democratic rule is consolidating, the ‘political socie-
ty’ has tremendous power and exercises control over the larger group of ‘inactive citizens’. In 
such polities, political actors and citizens often share vertical relations of authority and depend-
ency, state-society relations are dominated by patronage and populism; therefore citizens become 
dependent clients of political leaders upon whom they have very little means of accountability. 
Often political parties and party leaders rely on patronage strategies which are more cost-
effective in cases where votes can be bought in bulk by bribing a few opinion leaders. From this 
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perspective the universality of public service looks useless. Instead of seeking popular approval 
through the provision of public goods, politicians provide private goods to secure the endorse-
ment of influential public figures such as religious chiefs, or traditional leaders able to rally the 
masses. Therefore, the interests of the masses are not directly taken into consideration provided 
that political actors in office are not accountable to them but rather to a smaller constituency. The 
provision of such private goods has been identified as highly detrimental to agricultural GDP 
(Allcott & Lederman, 2006).  
Synthesizing. The literature identifies both structural and normative causes to explain the 
absence or the slow rural development in democratizing agrarian societies. Most arguments are 
built around the demand side of the public good provision equation.  Civil society mobilization is 
posed as the principal vector of government responsiveness to the needs of the majority in 
emerging democracies. Explaining the lack of agrarian development in democratizing agrarian 
societies has been heavily correlated with the lack of mobilization among the masses. The distri-
bution of political power has been identified as the variable influencing civic engagement and 
government responsiveness to citizens’ needs.  
However, this analysis raises the question of what role is played by citizens’ access to po-
litical institutions or lack of thereof as well as its impacts on governance. Rondinelli (1979) sug-
gests that "without pervasive administrative support or the mobilization of sufficient political 
power among rural beneficiaries to maintain steady pressure [...] reform will slowly dissipate" 
(397). Rondinelli (1979) asserts that rural development programs will only gain significant im-
pacts if they are accompanied by a political reorganization and governments can break patronage 
linkages by providing public goods and services superseding those provided by local patrons. 
However, in states where the patrons are often not only private actors but also political leaders 
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who manipulate and control the large peasant voting blocs, it seems unlikely to break the vicious 
circle unless institutional reforms are implemented to enhance democratic deepening thus em-
powering rural constituents. There is a relative scarcity of work that considers the link between 
decentralization of political and fiscal power towards localities and the provision of agriculture 
related public goods. Therefore exploring the supply side or institutional variables, could help 
further our understanding of the slow agrarian development observed in areas of the world where 
it is greatly needed. Democratic deepening or access to political institutions has been shown to 
have an impact on accountability (rural empowerment) and government’s responsiveness to con-
stituents. According to the literature on development and poverty reduction, decentralization has 
been widely sought across the newly democratized world as a process leading to democratic 
deepening, better governance and increased state capacity and service delivery. 
3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
The literature extensively explains the lack of agrarian development as a result of poor 
mobilization among the major beneficiaries of such reform which can be identified as small-
scale farmers, rural entrepreneurs, shifting cultivators, and landless laborers. Seeking explana-
tions about why in some consolidating democracies where the rural population is more often than 
not a majority, we do not observe agrarian development, raises the need to evaluate the role 
played by democratic institutions in providing the public goods necessary for growth. In this sec-
tion we will build an institutional argument linking decentralization and most specifically politi-
cal and fiscal decentralization to agricultural development in consolidating democracies. 
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Why are Institutions pertinent? 
This paper is mainly focusing on democratic systems of governance. In such polities, we 
assume that political power rests in the hands of the people who choose their political representa-
tives through free and fair elections and therefore have the leverage to influence politicians’ be-
haviors. Politicians are the representative agents of the population subject to its oversight and 
sanctions thus being accountable. Therefore, institutions in democratic systems in essence are 
designed to represent and serve not only the selecting group but the majority and act to fuel in-
creased political power for such majority. Democratic systems have sometimes been character-
ized as majoritarian systems in which the government should be responsive to the majority of the 
people (Lijphart, 1999) and thus seek to fulfill the interests of the majority. However, Lijphart 
(1999) also describes the majoritarian model of democracy as one that is exclusive in nature, as 
well as competitive and adversarial. In a democracy any majority is decisive; alternatively a 
smaller subset of the citizens might be decisive (Humphreys & Bates, 2005). This has often been 
the case in some parts of the developing world, and particularly observable in presidential de-
mocracies, which are common in Africa. According to Humphreys and Bates (2005), in new de-
mocracies, governments are responsive to a decisive subgroup of citizens who determine the 
government tenure in office based on its ability to provide the decisive group with private goods.  
New Democracies and the provision of Public Goods  
According to the literature on economic voting, in the context of democratic systems, 
voters decide to cast their votes accordingly to their perception of economic performances. This 
approach assumes "an agency relationship between voters and politicians" (Dutch, 2001, p. 895). 
Elected officials are in charge to serve the people that they represent by providing them with the 
public goods that they prefer and in exchange their constituencies would keep supporting them. 
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The main assumption is that political leaders seek legitimacy through elections and seek re-
election through the distribution of public goods.  However, mechanisms of accountability have 
been extremely weak in many transitioning states due to little democratic deepening. As men-
tioned previously governments in transitioning polities tend to favor policies sacrificing public 
interests for private ones. The development of patronage politics in many new democracies has 
been linked to the fact that in such polities the citizenry is divided between the political society 
on one end and the ‘inactive’ citizenry on the other. Lewis (1984) argues that “The third World’s 
failure with agriculture has been mainly at the political level, in systems where the small cultiva-
tor carries little political weight” (quoted in Bienen, 1987, p. 299). The lack of access to political 
power or the exclusion from the democratic process have negatively impacted rural citizens’ 
ability to exercise accountability mechanisms on their local officials, thus depriving them from 
effectively demanding public goods delivery. The concentration of political power in urban cen-
ters and among urban political actors has had a negative impact on rural empowerment and rural 
development in Africa.  
New democracies have often been described as resting mainly on an urban constituency. 
Indeed, in many developing countries, governments have often been responsive to the demands 
of elite citizens living in urban centers. “Most African leaders of today, [….] have been teachers, 
trade unionists, soldiers, party organizers, and civil servants whose ties with rural areas are tenu-
ous and their political and institutional bases of power usually are in urban areas” (Bienen, 
1987). Political power in Africa is also constrained by the limited amount of resources, especial-
ly those geared toward policy implementation. The politics of patronage enables politicians to 
secure a support base by providing economic rewards to their supporters on the basis of personal 
and communal loyalties. The new leaders tend to base their political support on urban voters, 
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who are geographically closer and able to mobilize their economic interests into political de-
mands. Therefore we can presume that in predominantly agrarian societies, the urban support 
base for politicians hinders the prospect for agricultural development in the sense that in order to 
fulfill their primary goal of remaining in power, political leaders must take into account the in-
terests of those who staff the ruling institutions rather than responding to the needs of the majori-
ty. The provision of private goods rather than public goods leads to de-prioritizing the pressing 
need for greater government’s investments toward agricultural development and rural empower-
ment. Allcott et al. (2006) find that the provision of such ‘non-social’ subsidies has been harmful 
to per capita agricultural GDP. Meanwhile empirical analysis have found a positive relationship 
between increased provision of rural pubic services, fostered by fiscal decentralization, and 
increase in agricultural GDP. 
Decentralization and the Provision of Public Goods  
Decentralization is a concept that has tremendously evolved during the past half century.  
Throughout political history it has been implemented through a range of institutional design and 
has aimed at achieving diverse goals. Indeed, when discussing decentralization one has to differ-
entiate the many processes that fall under this general concept. From Deconcentration to Devolu-
tion, Delegation and Delocalization (Kauzya, 2007) decentralization has yielded different results 
depending on how much power and state capacity the center has been willing to relinquish to 
subnational institutions and local populations. Deconcentration refers to the process that was 
predominant in the 1970s and 1980s (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007) which primarily aimed at dif-
fusing hierarchical government structures and bureaucracies; in other words it consisted purely 
on geographically restructuring the institutional design without changing the distribution of pow-
er between the center and subnational tiers. Therefore, political power and state capacity re-
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mained very much concentrated in the center having very little impact on public goods delivery 
at the rural level.  
However, in the late 20th century the concept of decentralization shifted toward a more 
inclusive approach covering political power sharing, fiscal decentralization, democratic partici-
pation through civil society mobilization and economic liberalization. This type of decentraliza-
tion is known as Devolution which goal has been “to strengthen local governments by granting 
them the authority, responsibility, and resources to provide services and infrastructures, protect 
public health and safety, and formulate and implement local policies” (Shabbir Cheema & Ron-
dinelli, 2007, p. 3). In most recent years decentralization in the developing world, has been 
sought as a way to enhance good governance and service delivery as well as a strategy to achieve 
poverty reduction. There has been a shift from decentralizing government to decentralizing gov-
ernance (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Decentralization has been advocated as a mean to wide-
spread democratic participation and decision-making. Most countries with democratic systems 
have developed some form of subnational administrative structures. By the end of the twentieth 
century, about 95% of the countries with democratic political systems had subnational units of 
administration or government (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). 
The conventional wisdom in the fiscal federalism literature posits decentralization as an 
optimal strategy for public goods delivery when citizens’ preferences are divers across localities. 
The literature identifies three classic channels through which fiscal decentralization is beneficial 
to economic growth:  informational advantage at the local level (Hayek, 1948), interjurisdictional 
competition (Tiebout, 1956) and higher preference homogeneity (Oates, 1972). Tiebout (1956) 
makes the argument that decentralization increases service delivery efficiency by allowing gov-
ernments to be responsive to the specific preferences of citizens in different regions. According 
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to Oates (1972) other things equal, local governments are more important in generating policies 
of public-service provision leading to rapid economic growth. However, this is all conditional on 
spillover effects across jurisdictions. Indeed, the theorem argues that in highly heterogeneous 
societies the provision of public goods with spillover effects at the local level constitutes a disin-
centive for local politicians to optimally provide goods that will also benefit neighboring locali-
ties. Therefore, in such cases the conventional wisdom emphasizes the need for some degree of 
centralization for an optimal distribution of public goods. However, such centralization should 
only aim at providing locally elected officials with further incentives to fulfill their responsibili-
ties and be responsive to their constituents ‘needs. Ndegwa (2002) talks about ‘upward’ account-
ability whereas the central government supervises local governments, as opposed to controlling 
it, by establishing institutional mechanisms of public accounts auditing, developing service de-
livery standards as well as monitoring and evaluating performances. The literature on fiscal de-
centralization stresses the importance of local governments’ autonomy and spending decision 
powers. Elhiraika (2006) study of fiscal decentralization and the provision of public goods in 
South Africa finds that the heavy reliance on central transfers towards subnational units reduces 
the prospect of enhanced transparency and increased accountability to local citizens which is 
posed as the vector for improved service delivery. In polities where most of local governments’ 
budgets are financed by the central government, subnational units have very little room to ma-
neuver in terms of expenditure allocations. In South Africa, intergovernmental transfers make 
provinces more accountable to the center therefore the enforcement of central management 
standards takes priority over meeting the needs of local constituents. In cases where local author-
ities have limited autonomy, increased provision of public services is highly contingent on the 
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central government ability to respond to local preferences known to be better identified by local 
leaders (Elhiraika, 2006). 
For Seabright (1996) elected local officials are always more accountable to their constitu-
ents compared to the central government. Seabright (1996) argues that despite the need for some 
degree of political centralization, deconcentration, or government appointment of local officials 
does not benefit decentralization outcomes since accountability is entirely to the central govern-
ment rather than to local constituents. This argument emphasizes the importance of democratic 
decentralization in establishing accountability through the democratic election of local officials. 
However, Bardham (2002) argues that in immature democracies the weakness of electoral mech-
anisms only provides for limited accountability at the subnational level. Indeed, one of the recur-
ring arguments against decentralization is the increased potential for the capture of local gov-
ernment by corrupted elites which has often led to reduced accountability and poor service deliv-
ery at the local level. Others such as Tresman (2000, 2007), Tanzi (2002), Shah (2003) and Man-
or (1999) make a similar argument on the risk posed by ill trained, unprofessional bureaucrats 
and political elites (Hankla, 2010) who do little to serve their communities but rather adopt pred-
atory behaviors in managing local affairs. This argument reinforces the position advocating for 
some degree of centralized oversight, and policy coordination to prevent predatory behaviors. 
Nonetheless, to observe effective decentralization, local governments should be able to retain 
their decision-making autonomy in order to capitalize on their informational channel advantage. 
Bardham (2002) makes the very compelling argument that analyzing the impact of decen-
tralization processes in developing countries requires moving beyond the traditional approach 
that centralization is better for dealing with spillovers and decentralization is better for dealing 
with heterogeneity. The major factors that have to be taken into consideration are institutional 
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processes as well as accountability at the local level and at the center. The central government 
plays a significant role in the decentralization process by providing state capacity to local author-
ities but also monitoring and establishing standards of service delivery performances. 
Therefore, we might say that in states where the procedural exercise of democracy is 
properly implemented, political decentralization establishes proper mechanism of accountability 
for local constituents thus increasing the prospects for a better response to local needs.  The ar-
guments in favor of decentralization are all built on the assumption that local politicians have 
political incentives to be responsive to the needs of their constituents.  Hence the argument de-
veloped in this theory proposes that combined political and fiscal decentralization are sufficient 
conditions for increased provision of agriculture related public goods which constitute the local 
preferences needed to foster agricultural development. The literature has explored the impact of 
decentralization on the provision of public goods. However, the focus of such studies has mainly 
been on the delivery of educational and health services and not so much on agriculture related 
services. Very little attention has been given to the effect of decentralization on agricultural de-
velopment although many development agencies such as the World Bank or the International 
Found for Agricultural Development (IFAD) have advocated for greater government’s input in 
the sector in order to foster growth. Indeed, the private sector is unlikely to supply investments 
necessary to sustain agricultural productivity because such investments would take the form of 
public goods over which there are no returns. For example private companies do not have any 
incentive to build roads or maintain them because they cannot control the free rider effect.  
Broad based agricultural growth cannot happen without a sustained government commitment to 
supply the goods necessary such as technology, infrastructure, markets and disease control sys-
tems essential to sustained growth (Haggblade, 2007). Moreover, evidences suggest that private 
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input subsidies are far less efficient, in terms of returns, than investment in public goods. Subsi-
dies for private inputs have been found to be of little efficiency across the developing world due 
mainly to resource misallocations and corruption whereas investment in public goods such as 
agricultural research and extensions as well as rural roads and irrigation have been found to typi-
cally produce returns two to six times greater than spending geared towards input subsidies such 
as fertilizers (Haggblade, 2007).  
Research on the effect of decentralization on various development variables such as eco-
nomic growth and citizen’s participation and service delivery has revealed mixed and uneven 
empirical evidences. Davoodi and Hang-Fu Zu (1997) find that there is no positive relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and growth. However, their study is limited given that their 
measure of fiscal decentralization does not account for the degree of autonomy in expenditure 
decision-making at the local level thus not incorporating the argument developed on the assump-
tion of better informational capacity which enables local officials to better identify the areas that 
need to received public investments. Also, the focus on fiscal decentralization alone does not en-
able to assess the strength of the mechanism of accountability at play in rural areas. Therefore, 
one could deduct that fiscal decentralization is a necessary but not sufficient condition to observe 
the impacts of decentralization on growth. Political decentralization has been found to play a 
fundamental role in empowering local citizens and providing them with the ability to make de-
mands and be actively involved in determining the policies that better serve their primary inter-
ests.  However, the impact of decentralization on civil society mobilization and citizen participa-
tion has been similarly found to widely vary depending on the nature and characteristics of the 
decentralization process implemented. For example in Africa, local governments’ attitudes to-
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ward their citizens have often been a replica of the central government’s attitude, which general-
ly have permitted little citizen participation within a context of democratic consolidation.   
Despite the mitigated outcomes of decentralization processes in consolidating democra-
cies, the failures have been associated with poor implementation rather than as being inherent to 
the concept itself. Decentralization is a process that has not always been successfully implement-
ed in the developing world and most particularly in Africa. As previously mentioned, in many 
developing countries successful decentralization has been threatened by the potential increase of 
elitism, nepotism and corruption at the local level, as well as by the timid transfer of fiscal power 
to local governments which is needed to enhance local state capacity and service delivery. 
Kauzya (2007) notes that in Rwanda, six years after decentralization was implemented, the lack 
of bureaucratic will prevented the effective decentralization of education, health and agricultural 
services that had been legally decentralized. In order to observe better performances of decentral-
ization civil servants at the center must be willing to facilitate “the process of transferring power, 
authority, functions, responsibilities, and requisite resources” (Kauzya, 2007,p. 80) to the locali-
ties. Often the many stakeholders and actors of decentralization have had divergent interests. 
Decentralization is likely to be successful when certain conditions are met, some of the 
conditions identified in the literature point toward a committed political leadership accompanied 
by a willingness to share power and authority as well as resources with localities. According to a 
World Bank’s evaluation (2008), although such conditions are not sufficient for successful de-
centralization they are necessary to improve the prospects of increased accountability and service 
delivery. Therefore, the efficiency of decentralization processes is contingent on central govern-
ments’ commitment and ownership of such processes.  
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The lack of access to political institutions both in terms of democratic decentralization of 
power, and fiscal decentralization (state capacity) play a crucial role in explaining the lack of ag-
ricultural development. Rondinelli (1979) suggests that developing countries have been unwill-
ing or unable to create the decentralized institutional structure that seems essential to meet the 
needs of the rural population. Rondinelli (1979) suggests that the implementation of develop-
ment programs in rural areas must be localized by decentralizing power which can be achieved 
either by creating field organizations, or by "devolution of functions of local institutions" (406). 
Extending Rondinelli’s latter argument; the argument developed in this paper suggests that in 
addition to institutional and fiscal decentralization which are necessary but insufficient, political 
decentralization is required to foster agricultural development. Democratic decentralization ac-
companied by fiscal decentralization motivates better provision of agriculture related public 
goods thus favoring agricultural development. Hence the theory developed in this paper draws 
the following hypothesis: 
(H1): New democracies that combine elected sub-national governments with fiscal decen-
tralization will be more likely to spend more in agriculture. .   
(H2): In such systems we should observe better agricultural outputs, other things equal.   
This research will contribute to the literature on agrarian development by linking political 
and fiscal decentralization with better provision of agrarian public goods and services leading to 
growth in the sector.  
It is important to explain and define Decentralization as used in the context of this re-
search. Many studies on the efficiency of decentralization have been conducted and most have 
revealed that it is a process which can yield different results depending on the context and the 
motives of the major actors involved in designing and implementing it.  
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Table.1 Theoretical Expectations  
              IV 
 
Expectations 
Political Decentraliza-
tion 
Fiscal Decentralization Interaction Term: 
Fiscal and Political De-
centralization 
 
 
-Increased accountabil-
ity  
 
-Provides greater incen-
tives for locally elected 
officials to be respon-
sive to their constituents 
and secure re-election 
through the allocation of 
expenditure toward lo-
cal preferences, here 
assumed to be agricul-
tural services.  
 
-However expenditure is 
also contingent on reve-
nue and spending capac-
ities 
-Revenue transfers in-
crease spending capaci-
ties.  
 
- Provision of public 
goods contingent on 
accountability  
 
-Increased accountabil-
ity to local constituency 
is contingent on the de-
centralization scheme: 
 
(a) localities dependent 
on the central govern-
ment are more likely to 
see their spending di-
rected by the center to-
ward services not al-
ways reflecting local 
preferences or priorities 
 
(b) localities able to 
generate a significant 
amount of their own 
resources are more like-
ly to spend toward pri-
ority areas such as agri-
culture services  
-Increased accountabil-
ity provides greater in-
centives for locally 
elected officials to be 
responsive to their con-
stituents by allocating 
funds towards priority 
services meeting con-
stituents’ preferences. 
 
-The availability of fis-
cal resources will in-
crease allocation of ex-
penditure for agriculture 
related services in pre-
dominantly  agrarian 
communities if local 
governments totally 
control their budget and 
are able to generate a 
portion of their own 
revenues 
                      
                            
 
                             DV 
 
 
Outcomes 
 
 
 
Input/ Output  
 
 
 
Input/ Output  
 
 
 
Input/ Output  
 Increase in public re-
sources for agriculture 
likely if fiscal resources 
are available. An in-
crease in Input would 
favor greater Output 
other things equal  
If there is an increase in 
public goods provision 
it would more likely be 
towards areas others 
than agriculture that are 
prioritized by the central 
government. 
Increased public re-
sources for agriculture 
related services which 
should have a positive 
impact on production 
other things equal  
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When talking of democratic or political decentralization, I refer to the definition used by Kauzya 
(2007) as to say “transferring the power of selecting political leadership and representatives from 
central governments to local governments; and transferring the power and authority for making 
socio-politico-economic decisions from central governments to local governments and communi-
ties” (p. 76).  This definition not only includes the procedural definition of the democratic pro-
cess but also incorporates the substantial definition of the practice of democracy.  Political de-
centralization therefore not only improves the inclusion of rural constituents in the electoral pro-
cess but also empowers them by providing them with the capability to directly influence the 
making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of decisions directly impacting their com-
munities economic and  social well-being and therefore enabling them to access mechanism of 
accountability with regard to their local leaders. Moreover political decentralization provides lo-
cal authorities with some degree of decision-making autonomy from the center. 
In order to be efficient democratic decentralization has to be accompanied by fiscal de-
centralization which provides local governments with spending resources and decision making 
capacities. Indeed, the delivery of public goods is influenced by increased accountability of the 
leadership but also by the degree of local authorities’ capacity to deliver such goods and deter-
mine allocations by order of priority. Usually, when local governments are granted revenue col-
lection powers, the revenue they are able to generate are very low and stagnant “and they can 
never cope with more than a fraction of the mandated service-delivery costs” (Wekwete, 2007, p. 
248). In general local governments throughout the world have not been expected to raise enough 
revenues given that often central governments retain the power to levy and collect all the buoy-
ant taxes (Wekwete, 2007). Therefore local governments often need funding from the center and 
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from the private sector, under the form of transfers, grants and loans in order to build their insti-
tutional capacity. However, the efficiency of rural governments is also influenced by the degree 
of revenue spending discretion they have which is highly contingent on the source of revenue. 
Since local leaders are closer to the communities they serve, they can better assess the priority 
sectors that need greater public input and have greater incentives to serve the interests of those 
who directly elect them. Therefore the more revenue autonomy local governments have the more 
likely they are to become efficient in responding to local needs.  
4 METHODOLOGY  
This paper seeks to analyze the impact of decentralization on agricultural development in 
consolidating democracies by using data from 30 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2000 to 
2010. The sample analyzed is taken from a previous study realized by Ndegwa (2002) for a sur-
vey on decentralization performances in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ndegwa (2002) findings reveal dif-
ferent degrees of overall decentralization across countries (fig 1) but also points out variations 
within countries with regard to different elements of decentralization. An overall decentralization 
index was developed by using three decentralization indices: political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralization and merging them together with other indices of accountability and system du-
rability.  
Restraining the empirical study to 30 countries in a specific region limits the generalizabil-
ity of the theory. However, given that agricultural development is a pressing issue that more 
acutely plagues the African continent, it is important to focus on this specific region. Moreover 
extensive data collection at both the national and sub-national levels has been achieved by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on countries from Sub-Saharan Africa which gives 
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researchers more room for within region comparison. In light of the secondary data already gath-
ered from both the World Bank and the FAO a quantitative method of analysis is preferred since 
it would enable the comparison of large datasets on various agricultural variables and their evo-
lution over time.  
One has to note that a major limitation of this study is the lack of data on fiscal decentrali-
zation for much of the countries in the sample. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS) database has very few entries indicating fiscal decentrali-
zation over the country/year selection. Therefore, the fiscal decentralization score calculated by 
Ndegwa (2002) will be reused and interacted with the Hankla et al (2010) variables on political 
decentralization.  The following section details how the independent and dependent variables are 
measured.   
4.1 Measuring the Independent Variable (IV): Decentralization 
This paper is testing the impact of decentralization on agricultural development. More 
specifically the focus is on the effect of democratic decentralization and fiscal decentralization 
on agricultural development. In order to measure the Independent Variable the political decen-
tralization variable developed by Hankla et al (2010) will be interacted with the fiscal decentrali-
zation index developed by Ndegwa (2002).  
Political Decentralization. In light of the arguments previously discussed, in order to eval-
uate political or democratic decentralization it is necessary to take account whether local officials 
are directly elected by their constituents. In order to measure democratic decentralization the var-
iables developed by Hankla et al (2010) will be re-used. 
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Figure.1 Ndegwa (2002) Overall Decentralization Score 
 
In the study two dummies were generated accounting for the presence of local elections. The first 
dummy variable labeled Municipal Election, Party Centralization (D1) is coded '1' when there are 
local elections and more than 75% of local council seats are occupied by  national parties and 
local party nominations are controlled by national party leaders. The second dummy labeled Mu-
nicipal Election, No Party Decentralization (D2), is coded '1' when local elections are observed 
and either less than 75% of local seats are occupied by national parties or party nominations at 
the local level is not control by national party leader or both. Both dummies take on a value of '0' 
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in the event that there are no local elections. For the purpose of this study a dummy variable po-
litical decentralization is generated by merging the two previously described variables and only 
accounting for whether or not there are local elections discounting the measure of party politics 
centralization. The dummy political decentralization is coded 0 when both D1 and D2 are equal to 
0; and coded 1 when D1=1 or D2=1 or both.  
Fiscal Decentralization. Ndegwa (2002) generated a fiscal decentralization index using 
two indicators: revenue transfers from the central government to localities and the score evaluat-
ing the proportion of total public expenditure controlled by the localities. This methodology is 
assumed to capture both spending capacity and decision-making capacities at the local level. The 
Fiscal decentralization index is simply the mean of the two indices. One could question such 
methodology which assumes that these two variables are equally influencing the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. Bardham (2002) suggests that mostly in the developing world fiscal decentrali-
zation remains challenging because local institutions heavily rely on transfers from the center in 
order to fulfill their spending functions, thus limiting their autonomy in spending decisions. 
Therefore, the focus should not only be on the proportion of public spending controlled by  local 
governments but also on their ability to collect their own revenues and their power to decide 
where to spend the money since they benefit from better information due to their proximity to 
their constituents. In that the fiscal decentralization index developed by Ndegwa (2002) is lim-
ited, as it does not capture whether or not local governments are able to generate a significant 
amount of their own spending budget. The fiscal decentralization score ranks from 0 to 4, with 0 
being the lowest and 4 the highest. Countries with an established and often-used formula for fis-
cal transfers and a high proportion of public expenditure being locally-controlled would score 
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high whereas countries with ad-hoc fiscal transfers to localities and a small share of public ex-
penditure being locally controlled would score low.  
Ndegwa (2002) specifies that overall fiscal decentralization remains marginal across the 
sample analyzed. The study reveals that less than 5% of the national public expenditure is con-
trolled by local government in 19 of the 30 countries analyzed. Across the developing world on 
average 14% of the public expenditure is controlled by local government, Africa is lagging be-
hind with an average of 10%. It seems necessary to note that in 2002 only South Africa was 
found to have a high degree of fiscal decentralization comparable with non-African developing 
countries. Other countries such as Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe scored relatively high within 
the sample with 5-10% of the public expenditure being decided at the local level. Kenya, Rwan-
da, Ghana, Senegal, Burundi, the DRC and The Republic of Congo were found to have relatively 
moderate level of fiscal decentralization with 3-5% of their public expenditure controlled by lo-
cal authorities. Finally, all other countries were found to have very low levels of fiscal decentral-
ization. Each country was awarded a score which will be used and interacted with the political 
decentralization variables in order to evaluate de degree of overall decentralization in each coun-
try. A more recent study on Decentralization in Africa shows that the proportion of public ex-
penditure controlled by local government is not enough to speak for the efficiency of fiscal de-
centralization. Indeed, in South Africa and Nigeria, although subnational units have substantial 
public service responsibilities, they raise only a very small fraction (10% or less) of their overall 
revenue (Dickovick & Riedl, 2010). When fiscal decentralization heavily relies on intergovern-
mental transfers, it is highly likely that the central government would retain control on expendi-
ture allocations through earmarks and directives. Therefore, the provision of public services 
might not directly reflect local constituents’ preferences.  
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 It is with no doubt that any result generated using the previously described index would 
have to be considered with caution. Ndegwa (2002) explains that although his measure of fiscal 
decentralization includes an assessment of rules of fiscal control and revenue collection, such 
assessment remains weak as very little hard facts were found. It is therefore difficult to distin-
guish the expenditure that was disbursed by local authorities but actually allocated and ear-
marked by central authorities from funds totally controlled by local governments. Re-using the 
score generated by the 2002 study also means that there are no newly calculated values for each 
country-year; rather the initial scores are used for all country-years. 
4.2 Measuring the Dependent Variable: Agricultural Input and Output 
When referring to agricultural development, we are referring to both agricultural input 
and output. Although we only have one dependent variable which is agricultural development, it 
is preferred to operationalize it into two different measurements: Input and Output. Input refers 
to the provision of public goods directly related to agriculture and susceptible to foster growth in 
that sector thus reflecting structural changes whereas output would capture the actual progress 
made in the sector in terms of production which is influenced by inputs.  
Measuring Input: In order to measure inputs two indicators developed by the Mo Ibrahim 
foundation (2011) will be used: Land and Water for Agriculture, Public Resources for Rural De-
velopment. They all specifically evaluate the role of the policy and institutional framework in 
promoting and providing agricultural input from the public sector. Each one of these indicators 
has scores varying from 0 to100 based on the normalization of initial scores. The detailed defini-
tion for each of these indices is available in index.  
Measuring Output: Agricultural Output will be measured by evaluating the evolution of 
conventional parameters of agricultural production. It is important to capture if the countries 
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‘food production levels are increasing in order to truly capture de notion of development since 
food security is one of the main development challenges that could be tackled with greater in-
vestment in the agrarian sector given that the vast majority of the rural population is involved in 
subsistence farming and the production of food crops. As previously mentioned in this paper an 
increase in crop yield is projected to have a positive impact on poverty reduction Total Quantity 
of Cereal produced will be used as a proxy to measure effective development and not just growth 
in the sector which has often been attributed to cash crops production and exports as opposed to 
food production.  
4.3 Control Variables  
Given that we are building the theory on the assumption of democratic systems, a Polity 
IV score will be used to evaluate the overall level of democracy. Moreover being that the sample 
analyzed is composed of countries which are highly vulnerable to political unrest, there is a need 
to control for it as any major change in political stability could have major impacts on both de-
centralization processes and economic growth especially in the event of civil unrest or armed 
conflicts. Thus we add a measure of political stability by using the political stability estimate 
generated by the World Bank (2011) which captures the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism. Input or the provision of agriculture related public goods is 
contingent on accountability, which is believed to be increased by democratic decentralization. 
Nonetheless the literature emphasizes the risk posed by the capture of local governments by local 
elites which would annihilate any incentives to provide public goods and rather favor the devel-
opment of patronage politics. Therefore it is appropriate to add a measure of local accountability 
using the Mo Ibrahim foundation (2011) ‘Accountability Transparency & Corruption in Rural 
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Areas’ (rur acct) score which takes on values varying from 0 to 100. Also the provision of agri-
culture related services can be influenced by the proportion of rural population. The idea is that 
the larger the rural population the more likely we are to have large demands for rural public 
goods. Finally to incorporate the most recurrent argument found in the literature to explain the 
lack of agricultural development, a measure of rural political empowerment is added by using the 
Mo Ibrahim foundation’s Dialogue between Government and Rural Organizatio  score which 
accounts for the rural poor ability to lobby government representatives. This indicator is coded 
on a normalized scale varying from 0 to 100. 
The literature emphasizes the crucial role of central government in terms of revenue 
transfers to localities. In Africa where local governments often mostly rely on grants and trans-
fers from the center in order to fulfill their spending functions it is necessary to add a measure of 
overall governance effectiveness to assess the center’s capacity to fulfill its functions. The World 
Bank (2011) developed a Government Effectiveness Estimate which captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies. Countries have scores on the aggregate indicator 
which vary from -2.5 to 2.5 in units of a standard normal distribution. Moreover the literature on 
fiscal decentralization underlines the need for some degree of centralization to maximize the ef-
ficiency of public service delivery at the local level. The theory developed by Hankla et al (2010) 
proposes that democratic decentralization accompanied by party centralization would maximize 
the distribution of public goods with spillover effects such as transportation and communication 
networks, which are very important to both rural and agricultural development. Hankla et al 
(2010)  argument builds upon Tiebouts (1956) and Oates (1972) and goes beyond by proposing 
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that the control of local politics by national parties curbs the negative impact of the spillover ef-
fect on public goods delivery by providing local leaders with incentives to optimally spend in 
services that might also benefit other communities. Therefore, we will control whether party pol-
itics is centralized reusing the Hankla et al (2010) dummy variable previously discussed. 
 Given that agricultural production is the dependent variable it is necessary to control for 
alternative explanatory variables such as: variations in GDP and GDP/capita as countries with 
higher GDP are expected to be able to invest more in agricultural services and therefore yield 
better outputs. Moreover, the overall economic stability can also explain variations in the de-
pendent variable. Outputs can also be influenced by climate since we are focusing on agricultural 
and food production. Crops heavily rely on climate conditions, droughts or flooding can have 
devastating effects on harvests. To assess climate conditions, we choose to focus on water avail-
ability and the average precipitation in volume (km
3
/year) for each country/year as measured by 
the FAO Aquastat division. 
Table.2 Summary of Variables   
INDEPEND-
ENT VARI-
ABLES  (IV) 
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 Hankla et al (2010) 
Political decentralization generated by adding 
two variables measuring the presence of munic-
ipal elections. coded 0 or 1 
 
    
Ndegwa  (2002)  
 
Fiscal decentralization index  
Coded 0 to 4 
INTERAC-
TIVE VAR-
IIABLES 
Political Decentralization*Fiscal Decentralization 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
AGRICULTURE INPUT  AGRICULTURE OUTPUT  
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(DV) 
 Mo Ibrahim foundation (2011) 
(1) Public Resources for Rural Develop-
ment  
(2) Land and Water for Agriculture    
FAO Statistical Database (2011) 
(1) Total Quantity Cereal Pro-
duced 
 
 
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES  
-%Rural population (The World Bank , 2011) 
- Accountability Transparency & Corruption in Rural Areas (The Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation, 2011) 
- Dialogue between government and rural Organizations (The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 
2011) 
-Political Stability Estimate (The World Bank, 2011) 
-Polity IV Index: overall level of democracy (Marshall & Keith, 2010) 
-Central Government Effectiveness  (Marshall & Keith, 2010)  
 -Variation in GDP  and GDP/capita: overall economic stability and income levels  
 (The World Bank , 2011)   
-Average Precipitation in volume   
 (FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011) 
-Degree of party politics centralization (Hankla et al, 2010) 
 
5 TEST & RESULTS  
In order to test the hypotheses developed in the theory we will run multiple cross section-
al time series regressions. The data was gathered from multiple dataset as mentioned previously. 
It is important to briefly describe the data in order to provide a better understanding of what is 
being assessed as well as verifying the distribution pattern. 
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5.1 Data Summary and Description  
The following table gives a statistical summary of the main variables used to construct 
the regression models.  
Table.3 Summary Statistics  
Variable Computation Method and Source  Mean Range  Expectation  
Public Resources 
for Rural Devel-
opment 
 
Evaluates: 
(a) adequate emphasis to the sector in 
its planning and budgeting  
(b) effective financial management   
(c) allocation and making available 
appropriate proportions of the sectori-
al budget to the different levels of 
government  
Index Score ranging  0-100 
 (Source: Mo Ibrahim foundation) 
50.17 0 to 
95.75 
Dependent varia-
ble (Input) 
Land and Water 
for Agriculture  
 
Institutional, legal and market frame-
work for rural poor access to land’ and 
‘access to water for Agriculture’ 
Index Score ranging  0-100 (Source: 
Mo Ibrahim foundation) 
41.75 .02 to 
79.74 
Dependent Varia-
ble (Input) 
Total Quantity of 
Cereal 
Cereals production in tones  3254841 9953 to 
3.02e+07 
Dependent Varia-
ble (Output) 
Political Decen-
tralization 
 
Dummy variable  coded 
0 = no local elections  
1= local elections 
(Source: Hankla et al 2010) 
.70 0 to 1 Positive but small-
er than with fiscal 
decentralization  
Fiscal Decentrali-
zation 
 
Index computed by averaging the 
score on revenue transfers from the 
central government to localities and 
the score evaluating the proportion of 
public expenditure controlled by the 
localities.  The Index varies from o to 
4 where 4 is the highest level of de-
centralization. 
(Source: Ndegwa 2002) 
2.08 1 to 4 Positive but small-
er than with politi-
cal decentraliza-
tion  
Political & Fiscal 
decentralization  
 
Interactive Variable:  
Political Decentralization*Fiscal De-
centralization 
1.58 0 to 4 Positive  
Political Stability  
 
World Bank Estimate  -.742178 -2.60 to  
1.18 
Positive  
Dialogue between 
government & 
rural organizations 
 
Assesses whether the rural poor are 
able to enter into dialogue with gov-
ernment or to lobby government rep-
resentatives 
56.44067 0    to     
97 
Positive 
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Score: 0-100  
(Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation) 
Rural Accounta-
bility 
 
Assesses the extent to which, at the 
local level: (a) government (both the 
executive, e.g. the ministry of agricul-
ture, and the legislative, e.g. the dis-
trict council) can be held accountable 
to rural poor people for its use of 
funds and the results of its actions; 
and (b) public employees and elected 
officials are required to account for 
the use of resources, administrative 
decisions and results obtained. Both 
levels of accountability are enhanced 
by decentralization of authority and 
responsibility for public functions, and 
by transparency in decision-making 
and disclosure of information 
Scored 0-100 
(Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation) 
49.20 6.75 to   
87.43 
Positive 
Government Ef-
fectiveness 
 
captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services 
coded -2.5 to 2.5 
(Source: World Bank) 
-.74 -1.96 to   
.73 
Positive  
Polity2 High Score = More democratic  
(Source: Marshall & Keith, 2010) 
2.15 -7 to      
9 
Positive  
 
In order to correctly analyze panel data, intraclass correlation needs to be taken into ac-
count.  In panel data the standard errors of the estimates will be off (usually underestimated), 
rendering significance tests invalid.  This happens because the standard errors that are normally 
reported with an analysis assume that each observation is independent of all other observations in 
the dataset.  To the extent that this is not true (i.e., as the correlation becomes larger), each ob-
servation contain less unique information. Therefore, we will use the random effects with AR1 
correction to generate more efficient parameter estimates.  
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5.2 Results  
Table.4 Results of the Input Models 
Variable Model 1 Model 2  
 Random Effects with AR1 cor-
rection: Public Resources for 
Rural Development 
 
(N= 143, 27 countries) 
(R2 = 0.7537) 
Random Effects with AR1 correc-
tion: Land and Water for Agricul-
ture  
 
 (N= 159, 27 countries) 
 (R2= 0.6200) 
Interaction Term  -5.999077* 
(3.121514) 
0.3205904 
(2.937616) 
Political Decentralization 
 
18.5897*** 
(6.888317) 
-1.338451 
(6.414058) 
Fiscal Decentralization 
 
2.524601 
(3.105713) 
3.112203 
(2.909666) 
Polity2 0.2741641 
(0.3322766) 
-0.2375212 
(0.3077586) 
GDP 1.55E-10** 
(7.27E-11) 
-2.83E-11 
(6.78E-11) 
GDP/capita  2.06E-10 
(4.33E-10) 
8.43E-10** 
(4.05E-10) 
Rural Population  0.5910875*** 
(0.1487529) 
0.143612 
(0.1349615) 
Government Effectiveness 7.325691** 
(3.592579) 
11.0879*** 
(3.305402) 
Rural Accountability  0.1806246* 
(0.0926125) 
0.0411554 
(0.0858773) 
Political Stability  4.17056** 
(2.029015) 
0.9330063 
(1.810329) 
Dialogue Between Govern-
ment & Rural Organizations 
 
0.1966184** 
(0.0764355) 
0.3388967*** 
(0.069185) 
Municipal Election National 
Party Control  
 
-5.249921 
(3.47734) 
-2.240472 
(3.056765) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Table 4 shows the impact of the interactive variable (Political decentralization*Fiscal de-
centralization) on Public Resources for Agriculture and on Land and Water for Agriculture. The 
coefficient on Public Resources for Agriculture is significant; however its direction is opposite to 
the predicted effect in H1. On the other hand, when fiscal decentralization is absent, we observe 
that political decentralization has a highly significant positive effect on Public Resources for Ag-
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riculture. The model shows that for every municipal election, there is an 18.6 percent increase of 
the score for the Public Resources for Agriculture index. It can also be observed that in the ab-
sence of political decentralization, fiscal decentralization has a positive coefficient, however it is 
not significant. Rural Population, Government Effectiveness, Rural Accountability, and Dialogue 
between Government and Rural Organizations all have significant positive effects on Public Re-
sources for Agriculture.  GDP/capita, government effectiveness and debate between government 
and rural organizations are the only variable having significant impacts with regard to Land and 
Water for Agriculture. The model shows that for a 1% increase in the government effectiveness 
score, there is an 11.1% increase of the Land and Water for Agriculture index ‘score. 
The interaction term reveals that local elections are very good for public investment in ru-
ral development under low levels of fiscal decentralization and that fiscal decentralization does 
not matter without elections.  However, the model also shows that when there are local elections, 
increases in fiscal decentralization actually reduce public investment in rural development. This 
latter observation is counter intuitive to the argument developed in this paper. Overall the test 
does not fully support hypothesis 1. One explanation could be that the lack of fiscal data on both 
revenue transfers to localities and local governments own-revenue sources lead to biased results. 
Local revenue collection capacity and decision making autonomy are not accounted for by this 
model, but they are important variables to take into consideration when evaluating the efficiency 
of public service delivery at the local level. Most importantly, a newly published USAID study 
on decentralization in Africa (Dickovick & Riedl, 2010) provides evidence that simultaneous 
democratic and fiscal decentralization do not immediately lead to increased state capacity (local 
resources and expenditure capacities). For example, the study shows that in Senegal, new local 
elections and simultaneous transfer of responsibility to local tax collection triggered a dramatic 
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decline in tax revenue. This phenomenon has been explained by the fact that newly elected local 
politicians are hesitant to implement existing taxes or new sources of tax revenue for fear of re-
taliation by voters. On the other hand, citizens lack trust in the new institutions and are not yet 
convinced that the funds will be properly allocated toward public goods in a context of new in-
terparty competition. Dickovick & Riedl (2010) describe the situation as a transitional adjust-
ment. In South Africa, Ghana, and Mali evidence show that initial hesitance has been replaced by 
systems which lead to increased trust (payment), participation (monitoring) and local fiscal au-
tonomy.  
Yet another explanation of why simultaneous fiscal and political decentralization do not 
encourage increased public investment in agriculture would be that in general the most common-
ly decentralized services have been the two major public services of health and education and 
few responsibilities in local economic development have been decentralized. The USAID study 
finds that over a sample of ten countries (of which 8 are being evaluated here), of all social ser-
vices some degree of devolution was mostly observed in education and health. Therefore, one 
could assume that depending on the fiscal decentralization scheme, agriculture related public 
services would come after health and education services. In cases where accountability is first to 
the central government and second to local constituents, it is more likely that local economic de-
velopment related services will be second to health and education. 
This latter explanation supports the central argument in this research that political decen-
tralization, by increasing downward accountability, encourages greater provisions of public 
goods at the local level. In predominantly agrarian societies such public goods would more likely 
include agricultural development related services. Political decentralization, if properly imple-
mented within a functioning democratic framework, should empower local citizens and make 
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them the primary source of accountability for locally elected officials. Accountability is the key 
mechanism at play, and political decentralization is the key vector for increased accountability 
among rural citizens. The test shows that political decentralization has a tremendous positive ef-
fect on public investment in rural development. Building on these findings could lead to further 
investigating what type of electoral system, state structure, and type of government most effec-
tively lead to an efficient political decentralization.  
Table.5 Result of the Output Model  
Variable Model 3 
 Random Effects with AR1 correction: To-
tal Cereal Production  
(N = 121, 26 countries) 
(R2= 0.6266) 
Interactive Term  1595163** 
(832630.7) 
Political Decentralization -2350489  
(1537000) 
Fiscal Decentralization 908552.6  
(843020.9) 
Public Resources for Rural Develop-
ment 
13052.56    
(19484.51) 
Polity2 123203    
(96813.54) 
GDP .0000471***     
(.000018) 
GDP/capita  -.0003254***    
(.0001221) 
Rural Population 7657.856    
(39426.68) 
Government Effectiveness -1559046*    
(913292.2) 
Rural Accountability 30311.55    
(20545.41) 
Political Stability  -360736.9    
(558140.2) 
Dialogue Between Government & Ru-
ral Organizations 
 
-25795.7   
(16878.93) 
Lagged Average Precipitation  1372.817**    
(690.1112) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 5 shows the results of the models on Output.  The interactive term has a significant 
impact on Total Quantity of Cereal Produced. In the event that we observe simultaneous political 
and fiscal decentralization, we can also observe the total production of cereal increase 
by1595163 tones. In the absence of fiscal decentralization we observe that political decentraliza-
tion does not have a significant effect on cereal production, although it is to be noted that the co-
efficient is negative. Similarly when no political decentralization is observed, fiscal decentraliza-
tion is found to have no significant impact on cereal production. These results confirm H2 as the 
interactive term has a highly significant effect on the dependent output variable.   
GDP and Precipitation have positive effects on cereal production, although in different 
proportions. It can be observed that for each additional km3 of precipitation per year there is a 
1373 tones increase in total cereal production. On the other hand both GDP/capita and govern-
ment effectiveness have significant negative effects on the dependent variable which is counter-
intuitive. The model shows that for a 1 point increase in the government effectiveness score there 
is a 1559046 tones decrease in cereal production.  
6 CONCLUSION  
This research aims at evaluating the impact of simultaneous democratic and fiscal decen-
tralization on the provision of agriculture related public goods in 30 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. The main implication of the theory developed here is that the combination of democratic 
decentralization and fiscal decentralization tend to lead to increased provision of agriculture re-
lated public goods. Democratic decentralization ensures that local officials are responsive and 
accountable to their constituents, while fiscal decentralization provides local institutions with the 
means necessary to carry out their spending functions. Studies on the impact of decentralization 
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on the provision of public goods delivery have already been conducted, but very few focused on 
agriculture related public services. To empirically test the hypotheses a dataset was built using 
indicators from multiple sources which were accounting for governments’ input, agricultural 
production, and the presence of local elections as well as the availability of fiscal resources at the 
local level. The model shows that political decentralization has a clear positive impact on public 
resources for agriculture while fiscal decentralization did not yield any significant results. Gov-
ernment effectiveness and rural accountability are also found to have significant positive impacts 
on public input towards agriculture.  
However, overall the findings do not support the theory developed in this paper. The in-
teraction term when significant has negative coefficients on all dependent variables. Also, very 
few parameters have any impact on Outputs. The model developed here has to be taken with cau-
tion provided that very little reliable data was found on fiscal decentralization. The proxy used to 
evaluate the degree of fiscal decentralization does not account for local governments’ autonomy 
and independence in spending decisions, which have been described in the literature as being 
necessary conditions for a better provision of public goods and increased downward accountabil-
ity and efficient responsiveness. The results of this study draw our attention on fiscal decentrali-
zation and its importance in shaping local governments’ capacity. In general, the literature finds 
subnational governments in Africa to be highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers. There-
fore, they have very little autonomy over their own spending choices and this is especially true in 
unitary states where resources decentralized have also been found to be inadequate to meet the 
decentralized service responsibilities. In such cases fiscal decentralization seems to represent 
more of a central government effort to reduce the load of its responsibilities rather than an effort 
to enhance governance (Dickovick & Riedl, 2010).  
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Ultimately this paper’s goal is to understand the role played by local governments in re-
sponding to the needs of the vast majority of rural constituents in African consolidating democ-
racies. In order for any such quantitative study on multiple African polities to be reliable and 
successful, more data has to be made available. This project should be revisited and further de-
veloped as more data is gathered.  Also greater attention should be paid to local governments 
‘ability to generate their own revenues and its impact on responsiveness to local constituents’ 
preferences and the provision of economic development related public services.  
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APPENDIX  
Accountability Transparency & Corruption in Rural Areas 
(The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2011) 
Definition: “This principal indicator assesses the extent to which, at the local level: (a) govern-
ment (both the executive, e.g. the ministry of agriculture, and the legislative, e.g. the district 
council) can be held accountable to rural poor people for its use of funds and the results of its 
actions; and (b) public employees and elected officials are required to account for the use of re-
sources, administrative decisions and results obtained. Both levels of accountability are enhanced 
by decentralization of authority and responsibility for public functions, and by transparency in 
decision-making and disclosure of information. A high degree of accountability and transparency 
is likely to discourage corruption or the abuse of office for public gain”  
SCORING METHOD       
Scored 0-100 based on normalization of the following indicator: Accountability, Transparency 
and Corruption in Rural Areas Index; 1-6 where 6 is best     
Source: International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)    
Average Precipitation in Volume  
(FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization, Aquastat 2011) 
Definition: Long-term average (over space and time) of annual endogenous precipitation 
(produced in the country) in volume. 
Unit: km3/year or 109 m3/year 
Calculation Criteria: [Average precipitation in volume] = [Total area] * [Average precipitation in 
depth] / 100000 
Central Government Effectiveness 
(The World Bank , 2011) 
Definition: Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a 
standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
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Crop Yield  
(FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011) 
Definition Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases 
yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area har-
vested. Data on yields of permanent crops are not as reliable as those for temporary crops either 
because most of the area information may correspond to planted area, as for grapes, or because 
of the scarcity and unreliability of the area figures reported by the countries, as for example for 
cocoa and coffee.  
Sources: FAO Statistics Division 
Dialogue between government and rural Organizations  
(The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2011) 
Definition: This principal indicator assesses whether the rural poor are able to enter into dialogue 
with government or to lobby government representatives and express their concerns and priori-
ties with regard to issues crucial to their livelihoods. It looks at whether the government is re-
sponsive to rural poor people, whether it takes into consideration their views in developing the 
policy, strategic and investment framework for the sector, and whether it provides a conducive 
environment for such exchange.  
Scoring Method: Scored 0-100 based on normalization of the following indicator:    
Dialogue Between Government and Rural Organizations Index; 1-6 where 6 is best   
Source : International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)     
 
Land and Water for Agriculture  
(The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2011) 
Definition: "There are two components to this indicator at source:  ‘Access to Land’ and ‘Access 
to Water for Agriculture’. 
Access to Land: This principal indicator assesses whether the legal, institutional and market 
frameworks provide the basis for the rural poor to have secure access to land – both individually 
held and common property resources – and whether the poor are able to benefit from these. 
Access to Water for Agriculture: This principal indicator assesses whether the policy and institu-
tional framework provides for the rural poor, on the one hand, to have equitable user-rights over 
water resources for agriculture, and, on the other hand, to effectively manage those resources."  
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Scoring Method: Scored 0-100 based on normalization of the following indicator: Land and Wa-
ter for Agriculture Index; 2-12 where 12 is best        
Source : International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)  
Political Stability Estimate 
For detailed definition refer back to The World Bank , 2011 
Polity IV Index 
For detailed definition refer back to (Marshall & Keith, 2010) 
Public Resources for Rural Development  
(The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2011) 
Definition: This principal indicator focuses on government policies, strategies and investment 
programs for the agricultural and rural development-sector, and on the efficiency, consistency 
and transparency with which resources are allocated and managed, and their use is reported on. It 
assesses whether government: (a) gives adequate emphasis to the sector in its planning and 
budgeting and has in place policies, strategies and investment programmers that are appropriate 
and consistent with each other; (b) has in place effective financial management systems to ensure 
that expenditures are consistent with the approved budget, and to provide for timely and accurate 
financial reporting and auditing; and (c) allocates and makes available appropriate proportions of 
the sectorial budget to the different levels of government (national, state, provincial, district and 
below, as relevant).   
Scoring Method: Scored 0-100 based on normalization of the following indicator:    
Public Resources for Rural Development Index; 1-6 where 6 is best     
Source : International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)     
  
 
 
